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ABSTRACT
The Welfare I mpacts of Environme ntal Regulation in
an Open Economy
by
Nicole Glineur, Master of Science
Utah State University, 1985
Major Professor: Dr. Terrence F. Glover
Department: Economics
The major theoretical and practical economic issues on poll ution have .apparently been sorted out.

However, the bulk of the liter-

ature in environmental economics shares a shortcoming:

the disregard

of the welfare implications and consequences of pollution control.
Traditionally, pollution is viewed as a joint product.

In this

study, the issue of trade and environmental regulations is cast as a
problem of input regulation, and the subsequent welfare implications
of input regulation are then derived.

The purpose of the present

r esearch is to emphasize the welfare consequences of pollution control
in the context of international or interregional trade .

The Batra and

Casas, Yohe , and McGuire models lay out the theory of the use of the
environment in an open economy, deriving the effects of pollution on
factor rewards.

Using some generalizations of the models , the welfare

vii

impacts of changing regulations which govern the use of the environment are derived .
It is see n that for both a small and la rge country ( re gion )
with identical individuals,

there is an optimal level of pollution.

In the case where the economy is made up of two differ e nt groups of
individual s, workers and capitalists (capital owners) in a smal l
country (regio n),
or lo se .

the workers lose while capi talists can either gain

In the lar ge country (region), it cannot be unam biguousl y

determined whether workers and capitalists will be bett e r or worse off
than before the regulation changes .

(71 pa ges)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Issue Stateme nt
Today, the major theoretical a nd practical economi c issues on
pollu tio n have been so rted out.

However, the bulk of the 1 i terature

in environmen tal economics s har es a sho r tcomi ng : the disregard of the
welfare implications and consequences of pollution cont rol.
Traditionally , pollution is viewed as a joint product.

In this

s tudy, the i ss ue of trade an·d environmental regulation is cast as a
problem of input regulation, and t he s ubsequent welfare implications
of input re gul at ion a re th en derived . Environmental regu lation has
been incorporated into the theory of produ ctio n a nd trade but the
question of the welfare impacts of pollution co ntrol has rec eiv ed only
mod est attention.

Not only is the state of knowledge i n the area

rudimentary , providing onl y a limited basi s for general i zation, it is
also devo id of empirical di r ect ion.
The

purpose of the prese nt r esea rch is t o emphas ize the wel-

fa r e conseque nces of poll ution control in the context of in ter na tional
or in ter regional trade ,

whi ch here tofore , has been neglected .

Econo-

mists s uch as Bat ra and Casas, Grubel, McGuire , Weitzman, and Yohe
have establishe d a precedence for s u c h an approach . The Bat r a and
Casas, Yohe, and McGuire models lay ou t the theory of the use of the
enviro nment in an open economy .

They ha ve derived the effects of
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pollution on factor rewards, however, the welfare impacts of environmental regulation have been left aside .

Consequ ently, it

is the

we lfare ramifications of regulation of the use of the environment as
an input that is addressed in this study.
Objectives
The overall aim of this study is to analyze, in an open economy
and within a general framework, the impact of the exogenously imposed
changes in the level of pollution control on the welfare of labor and
capital.
1.

The specific objectives include:

A description of the s tatic general e quilibrium Heckscher-Ohlin
model, which reveals the effects of e nvironmental controls on
factor rewards in an open economy.

2.

An

analysis of the welfare impact of a change in the pollution

control level for a small co untry (region), i.e ., price-taking
region, with identical individuals (identical preferences of
laborers and owners of capital) .
3.

A study of the effects of a change in input regul ation on the
welfare of labor and ca pital in the small country ( region)
context.

4.

A description of the implications of the large ~o untry (region)
ass umption with va riable output prices.

5.

An analysis of the welfare impact of a variation in the pollu tion control level for a large country consisting of identical
individuals .

6.

An estimate of the change in input regulation implications for
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the welfare of l abor and capital in a large country (region)
context.
Given a welfare analysis which generalizes the Yohe-Batra-Casas model,
we summarily conclude that:
A.

For a small country (region):
l)

with identical individuals,

there is an optimum level

of poll uti on.
2)

with two different groups of individuals,
capitalists,

workers and

the workers will lose, while capitalists

can either gai n or l ose when regulation of the environmental input is relaxed.

Workers reduce

their

consumption of the goods and at the same time pollution
is increased; capitalists gain through a rise in capital
B.

returns.

For a large country (region):
l)

given identica 1 individual s in the economy, there is an
optimum level of pollution.

2)

as the economy is divided into two different gro ups, it
cannot be unambiguously determined whet her workers and
capitalists will be bett er or worse off than before the
regulation changes. Other production parameters, such
as the elasticities of substitution betwee n factors,
factor intensities, etc., would have to be known.
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CHAPTER II
EXTERNALITIES, USE OF THE ENVIRONMENT, AND TRADE:
A REVIEW
The Presence of Externalities
Traditionall y, pollution is viewed as an externality, caused by
consumption and/or production of pollution-causing goods.

The need to

devote a section to externalities, while treating pollution is eloquently expressed by the Dorfmans: 1
The mutual interference of the users of a shared resource
is a special case of the gen era l

phenomenon of ex terna lities:

an _externality occurs whenever the activities of one person

affect the welfares or production functions of other people
who have no direct control over those act ivit ies • • . • It
follows that the analysis of e nvironmental problems is to a
large extent an application of the general principles of
public goods and externalities.
"An externality arises when economic agents do not pay for the
entire social cost of their activities". 2

Exa mpl es of social costs

are land disruption, wat e r and air pollution, climatic changes,
health, a nd occupational hazards.
An externality is generated whenever one of the following four
situations exists:

1.

The inputs or outputs of one firm enter directly into the
production function of a nother firm or firms .
production

function

of

the

farmer

For example, the

is affected when the
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pollutants from a factory smokestack causes damage to crops
grown on his neighboring farm.
2.

The inputs of a firm enter direct l y into the utility function
of some individual(s).

An example where inputs or outputs of a

firm affect the well - being of society members is when the
pollutants from a factory are detrimental to the health of the
individual(s) su bject ed to them.
3.

The consumption of a good by one individual affects the utility
function of another individual or individuals.

For instance ,

the education of a child influences the well-being of others by
contributing to the working of society.
4.

The consumption of a good by an individual affects the production function of a firm or firms.

In example, the outpu t of

the farmer is affected when the watershed characteristics of

adjacent land are altered by private const ructions.
These effects can be marginal, meaning that the production or
preference functions are affected by s mall changes in the variables
outside a firm's or an individual's control, or inframarginal, in that

they are affected only by large changes in these variables.
relationships are direct:

The

they work dir ectly through changes in the

production and/or preference functions rather than indirectly through
the price system. 3
From the four a bove cases , it can be seen that externalities
cause private and social costs and benefits to diverge.

Thus, with

the presence of externalities the optimality property of a competitive
equilibrium is not obtained.

6

Looking at the first case, if on e producer does not consider
the positive or negative effects of his activities on other producers,
his output wi ll be less or greater tha n the social optimum.

Assume he

is creati ng s moke which is lowering another producer's outp ut.

The

re duction in output of the second firm represe nts a real cost , borne
by society, of the first producer' s activity.

Since the producer does

not bear this cost himself--his private cost of produc tion is less
than the social cost--he will thus tend to overproduce.
Externalities distort market e quilibrium away f rom efficiency.
How to correct the di verge nce, induce d by externalities, between
private and soc ial costs has been the focus of at tentio n of many
economists.

Environmental disruption was first analyzed as a static externality, fol lowing Pigou's book , The Economics of Welfare, 4 which led
to the recognition that th e proper system of t axes and s ub sidies could
cor r ect the s uboptimalit y ge nera t ed by externalities.
Apart from the concern of Pigo u in 1932 , li tt l e was done in
e nvironmental

poll uti on unt i l

the 1960s. Befo re Coase 's

publication

on socia l cos t, 5 it was generally thought that subsidization of the
ge ne rator s of external eco nomi es was n ecessary to increase

the

socially be neficial activity, a nd that the taxation of generators of
external diseconomies was necessary to decrease the socially harmful
activity .
Building from the traditional ap proach of a two- pa rty exter nality , Coase emphasizes the reciprocal nature of externalities, the
duality of the tax subsidy scheme , and t he us e fulness of private
agreement through bargaining t o arrive at the opti mal state .

The

7

reciprocal exter nalities argument is illustrated in the case where the
factory's smoke is destroying the crops of a nearby farm.

It seems

equitable to force the factory to compe nsate for the crop damage or
control the smoke, or both.
hurts the factory owner.

However, while this helps the farmer, it

This is a reciprocal damage situation.

If

property rights rest with the factory owner, permitting him to produce
as much smoke as he wishes, it would benefit the farmer to bribe the
factory owner to reduce smoke output up to t he point where an additional dollar spent on the bribe just equals the benefit accruing to
him from the reduction in s moke damage. ·In the case where property
rights rest with the farmer, the dualit y assumption becomes a consideration .

If the farmer's conse nt is required before .t he factory is

authorized to discharge any smoke, it would pay the factory owner to
bribe the farmer to allow him to produce smoke up to the point where
the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits.

As the costs and

benefits are symmetrical in the two cases , the result is identical,
abstracting from bargaining costs which are real and will often prevent a so lut io n.

Though in both cases income distribution affects and

is affected by va rious bargaining positions and strategies, the effect
on the efficiency of output is the same.
Since the victims will bribe the polluters to reduce pollution
beyond the optimal point induced by the tax, Buchanan and Stu bblebine6
showed that a pollution tax can lead to too little pollution.

Fisher 7

correctly points out that the significance of this result is weakened
by the prohibitive transaction costs of the t ypical many party pollu tion case . 8

Also crucial is Mishan's point that property right s

8
affect the use of resources.

Because of the consumer ' s income con-

straint, there may be a difference between the amount an individual is
willing to pa y fo r clean air, for example, and the amount he or she
will require in compensation for the loss of this good.

This diffi-

culty is likely to arise when the damaged party is a consumer.
While Coase, Buchanan and Stubblebine9 adequately examine the
above facets of the problem, they do not consider the public goods
aspect of many externality problems that deprive their solution of
policy relevance.
The Coase theorem fails as a challenge to pollution-control
policy invo l vi ng some form of public intervention . It does
offer an insight into the virtues of the market in dealing
with certain kinds of exter nali ties, but generally not th8se
associated with pollution or other environme nt disruption. 1
Environment as an Input
The externality which we a r e concerned with in this research is
pollution.

Traditionally, pollution is viewed as a joint output.

Here, pollution is the result of the use of the enviro nm ent as an
inp ut in the production process.

Yohe argues that the polluter should

pay a compensation for the use of the

environment, ju st as labor

effort is rewarded with wages.
As mentioned in Chapter I, the Batra and Casas, Yohe, and
McGuire models lay out the theory of the use of the environment in a n
open economy.

They have

derived the effects of tighter pollution

control on factor rewards as follows:
1.

As the envir onment is regulated , assuming constant prices and
provided that the demand for the regulated product is elastic,
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the factor used intensively in the nonregulated industry will
gain i n ter ms of both goods.
2.

As prices vary, the returns to capital and labo r move in oppo site directions, depending on the factor intensity of the
nonpolluting sector.
The two - good/three-fact or Batra - Casas model is the starting

point of this research, followed by the Yohe and McGuire stud i es, 11 on
the backward incidence of tighter pollution control s onto the factors
of production.

Hence, th e focus is on Yohe's work when prices vary

with output.
The Batra-Casas model is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin interna tional tra de theor y.

Following Batra and Casas , McGuire, and Yohe,

the impacts of pollution co ntrol are ana lyz ed in a two-sector (o n e
polluting, one not) static general eq uilibrium model.

Each sector is

producing one goo d using three factors of production: capital, land,
and e n viro nment.

The Batra a nd Casas model, along with the Yohe and

McGu ire a nal ysis, assu me pollution occ ur s because of the use of
inputs, one being the e nv ironmen t , to produce the primary good.

They

do not assume joint production of the good and the pollution as is
common in pollution-control studies. Since the focus here is on the
welfare implications of input regulation, changes in r egulations are
represe nt ed as changes in the use of one of the factors of production
in an open economy.

The Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory a nd the Regulation
of the Use of the Envi ronme nt
The overall aim of this study i s to analyze, in an open economy
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and within a general equilibrium framework, the impact of the exogeno u sly imposed changes in the level of pollution control on the
welfare of labor and capital.

The analytical framework of the tradi-

tional Heckscher - Ohlin model of international trade yields some useful
insights about the factor endowments explanation of the basis for
trade, and the effects of trade on income distribution.

It gives the

most comprehensive explanation of a country's economy.

The exchange

of goods is the essence of the internation al trade problem, and, in
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, factor endowments guide the allocation of
resources according to comparative advantage.
Environmental re gulation has been incorporated into the th eory
of production and trade.

International trade theory help s to deter-

mine the incidence of pollution control on the factors of production.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model shows that the direc tion of the incidence
depends upon the relative factor intensity of the nonpolluting sector.
In the framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, environmental regulation is characterized as a control over utilization of the environ-

ment.

The incorporation of the regulated factor environment in the

Heckscher-Ohlin model enables us to derive some results.

For example,

by applying certain properties of the model, we can de duce some consequences of substituting labor a nd capital for environment in order to
reduce pollution.
Generalization of the He ckscher -Ohlin Model to
Three Factors of Production
By incorporating environment as an input in the production
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process, we are using a third factor of production.

The simple "two

by two" Heckscher-Ohlin model does not capture all the factors of
production.
The validity of presumption originated from a Heckscher-Ohlin
type of model is questioned.

Authors such as Grubel and Ahmad contend

that the extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model into cases involving
more than two factors of production is difficult and results in ambiguo us answers.

Ahmad raises the following points.

First, the generalizations

of Heckscher-Ohlin model have only been proven for the two-factor
cases.

Firm results are not possible when the number of factors is

increased.

Second, if environment is included as an additional factor

to capital and labor in the production process, it is difficult to
determine the market price.

"Environment, like any factor of produc-

tion, has a cost, but because of externalities this cost is not properly reflected in the private costs of production." 12

Third,

"Heckscher-Ohl in theory points only to a tendency for specialization
in line with factor endowments." 13
Jones and Takayama argue that the challenged restriction of the
model to "twos" offers ease of exposition and clear results.
In defense of the generalization of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory
to three factors of production, Jones 14 offers the following conclusions:

if the number of factors of production exceeds the number of

outputs, the general Rybcynski result remains valid and a rise in any
single commodity price will cause at least one factor to gain in real
terms and at least one factor to lose.

12
He observes that a series of propositions, presented by the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, reveal that productive techniques involve a
combination of several inputs to produce a single output in each
sector: 15
the assumption of no joint production injects an asymmetry
into the input-output constellation, and this asymmetry gets
reflected in magnified relationships between output prices and
factor prices, on the one hand, and factor endowments and
industry output at (constant prices) on the other.
Assuming a greater number of inputs creates new possibilities,
of which, says Jones, the most important one is the constant factor
returns effect of relative price changes.

When there is an excess of

two factors, the excluded middle can be filled in,

Jones concludes

that "two-dimensional building blocks not only provide the firm foundations upon which trade theory is constructed but present a standard
of comparison against which truly multidimensional results can be
appreciated ." 16
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CHAPTER III
THE MODEL
Wi th the two-good /th re e- facto r Batra-Casas model being the
starti ng point
prese nted .

of this re search, a r eplica of the model will first be

Next , the development of Yohe's and McGuire' s studies, on

the backward inci dence of tighter pollution controls onto the factors
of production, are summarized.
when prices vary with output.

Hence, t he focus is on Yo he's wor k

Based on Yohe 's results, an attempt to

derive the we lfare impact of pollution control is made.
The following proced ure is ado pte d.

The fir st ana l ysis will

concent rat e on the smal l co unt ry case,

with pollu tio n entering

directly the consumer' s utilit y function.

The focus will then be on

the farge country case , assuming an economy with ide ntical individuals
to l ater r elax this assumption and a l so concen tra te on t he variable
output prices a nd pollution control levels.
Pollution Control in the Open Eco nomy Case , A La
Yohe-Batra - Casas-McGuir e
Re pl ica of t he Batra- Casas Model
The model's assumptions are :
1.

An eco n omy with two sectors 1 and 2, where 1 is the polluting
sector ( impose s the externality)

15

2.

Three factors of production: capital (K), labor (L), and environment (E)

3.

The two sectors are characterized by strictly quasiconca ve ,
linear homogeneous production functions:
fl(Kl, Ll, El)

(1)

f2(K2 , L2, E2)

(2)

with the restriction that a corner solution, in which one of
the goods (sector good) can be produced solely by the use of E,
cannot be reached.
Full employment economy is then described by:
Ll + L2

au y l + aL2 Y2

L

(3)

Kl + K2

aKl yl + aK2 y2

K

(4)

El + E2

aEl yl + aE2 y2

E

(5)

where aij = requirement of input i to produce one unit of output j; L

and K are the fixe d endow ments of labor and capital to the economy;
and E is the allowable level (set by the regulator) of the environment
that can be used by both sectors of this two-sector economy.
This constraint is binding, so equality holds in the last
relationship.

The permissable pollution is regulated, i.e., E is

regulat ed (and it is assumed that industries pollut e up to that
ievel).
Now assuming cons t a nt returns to scale, there is a zero profit
condition.
(P

=

AC

for w

Then price equals constant average cost or marginal cost

= MC), so,
aLlw + aKlr + aElq

( 6)

aL2w + aK2r + aE2q

(7)

wage; r = capital price ; and q

shadow price for enviro nment .
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The aij are now the factor demands about their respective unit
isoquants and take the form,
aij

= aij(w,r,q)

, i

= L,

K, E and j

(8)

1, 2

where q can be viewed as an effluent charge or a quantity standard.
The above equations are the basic equations for the two - good,
three-factor model.

Equipped with the above structure,

the focus is

now on the effects of changes in the allowable level of pollution (E)
on labor and capital.
Differentiating the full employment relationships, the employment relations yiel d:
*
YtALl + Y2A12

L* -

(ALla~l + A 12a~2)

( 9)

YtAKl + Y;AK2

K* - (AK 1 a~ 1 + AK2a~2)

(10)

Y~A E 1 + Y;AE2

E* - (/..Ela~l +

(ll)
I.. Eza~z)
*
dY ·
K, E; y. = .::..:..1. (equals percentage
J
yj

= y j~ i j. j =

1, 2; i = L,
1
change in the variable, the asterik represents the differential of the
Y la Ll .
variable). Hence, ALl = --1--- 1s the share of the economy's endowment

where Aij

of labor used in production of Y1 .
Now differentiating equations (6) and (7) , the zero profit
conditions, P = AC = MC, yields to the price relations:
*
p*
yLl w* + YKl r + YE lq *
1
p*
yL2w* + YKzr * + YE2q
2
1
1
1
where wdYLj
+ qdYEj = 0 was used.
+ rdYKj

(12)

,,

(13)
Then Yij is the value share

of factor i in commodity j, i.e., YLl = aLlw/Pl .
Now differentiation of the unit isoquant factor

demands

(derived demand) gives the percentage ·change in input demands in
response to factor price changes.

The aij is homogeneous of degree
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zero (in factor prices) .

The di fferentiation and the zero

homogeneity, and the fact that the factor elasticity, say Slm = Yjmcr~i
(sa y, for example , caa 11 ;ar}-L..aLl

=eLK =y Klcr R1 )

. * *
*
aLj = -YKj cr ~ 1 (w - r ) - YEj cr~ 1 cw*-q*)
*
aKj = - YLj crtK(w*-r*) - yEj cr~Kcr*-q*)
*
aEj = - YLj 0 tE(w*-q*) - YKj o~Ecr*-q*)

gives ,
(14)

( 15)
for j = 1, 2

(16)

then solving for Y~ and Y~, an d the emp l oyme nt relations (9) and ( 10)
simultaneously result in:

y~ = {AK1[L* - ( AL1 a~l + A L2a~2)]

AL2[K*- ( AK 1 a~1 + AK2a~2)] }

ALl AK2 - AKl AL2
(17)

(1 8 )

These latter equations can be simplified if we let
and
i

= L, K, E; m = L, K, E; and m = i,

then we get the simp lification :

Y7

= AK 2(L* + DL) - AL2(K* + DK)
(19)

ALK

y~ = - AK1( L* + DL) + ALl (K* + DK)

(20)

hKI

Now , substituting the se latter two eq uations, (19) and (20) , in t o the
las t employme nt rela t io n (ll) :
or

IA EK!cL* + D2J + 1\EicK* + DKJ + IAKL icE* +DEl=
IAEK ,DL + IALE IDK + IAKL IDE = R

o

(21)
( 22)
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where R = 1\ KEIL* + 1\ELIK* + 1\LKIE* •

This latter relationship (22)

can be expanded after substituting for the Di and a;j terms to get a
polynomial in w*, r*, and q* as
R

=

Aw* + Br* + Cq*

(23)

Then, using equations (12), (13), and (23), the model can now be
closed and solved for w*, r*, and q* from the matrix equation set:

( 24)

Yohe assumes YE 2 = \EZ = OCE =

o[E

= oiE = 0, or only one of the

sectors, sector 1, uses the e nvironment via pollut ion.

Also, in

sector 1, only K (capital) is substi tutable with E (environment).
The change in w, r, and

as allowab l e pollution

levels change
First, factor intensities in each output (1, 2) are needed.

It

can be represented that sector one is pollution- (or environment-)
intensive if

and

aEl
aKl

> aE2

aEl
aLl

> aE2

=

0

=

0

aK2
aL2

(a Yohe assumption)

and is capital-intensive in the weak factor intensity sense.
Sector two can be made labor-intensive by
and
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Let us sol v e t h e mat rix equation (24) for w"/E* by setting
K" ~ L<· ~ P7 ~ P~ ~ 0.

This assumption imp lies that the polluting

count r y (o r r egion) is a smal l country, taking world prices as given.
Sol ving equation (24),

'LKI

/
_YK2 YE l i 1
E* ~
G

<0

(25)

whe re IALK I ~ (aLl - aL2)(YlY2aK laK2)
aKl
aK2
LK

<

0 ,

and G is the

determinant

of the left-hand side of the matrix equation system expressed as
G

~ Y~Yl(ALYlAKYly Y2°LR +

ALY2AKY2Yn °fR)/ YE

2

- ( YLYl - YLY2) ( AKYl AEYl yY2 °n)/ yL
The assumptions made a r e that the production function is strictly
quasiconcave and a LE

a [~

~

a*[ ~ 0

and

whi ch i mplies tha t G

0 (no labor-envir onme nt s ub stitution) then ,
,

< 0 (in the pollutin g industry).

The a bo ve result (25) says that as r egulati on (co nt ro l ) is
relaxed on pollution, the pa yme nt to l a bo r will fall.

So lving for

capital, s imilarly, as
r*
YLzYElj ALKj
E* ~
G

>0

(26)

So , as pollution is increase d, payment to capi tal increases.
Finally,

.L_ ~
E*

(Yu YE2 - YL2YKl) I ALK
G

I <0

where (YLlYK2 - YL2YKl) - (aLl _ aL2 )(wr aKlaK2)
aKl
aK2
P1P2

(2 7)

<0

The shadow price on the use of the environme nt falls as the pollution
le ve 1 is increased.
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From there it can be shown that

* <0

¥2
E*

and

(28)

which are the Rybczynski theorem results of trade theory applied to
this pollution control case.
As the allowable pollution level varies,

it will affect

national (regional) income : I = wL + rK + qE
I* = Y1 (w* + L*) + YK(r* + K*) + YE(q* + E*) .
It can be shown that y 1 w* + yKr* + yEq* = 0, so
I*= y 1 L* + y KK*

(29)

for 1* = K* = 0

(30)

A decrease in pollution level lowers national income if prices are
constant.

Thus, under that condition, an increase in the pollution

level will raise national income.

Derivation of the results of varying
prices on factor rewards
We then proceed,

following Yohe and others to derive the

results under varying prices.

The following is based on Yohe's paper

on "The Backward Incidence of Pollution Contro1." 17

To derive the

results of varying prices on factor rewards, equation (24) needs to be
solved.

Yohe concentrated on the effect of variable commodity prices

on factor rewards as environment is altered.

The rate of changes in

yl and Y 2 are:
y*

l

nlp~

y*
2

T12P~

where the coefficient

1\

product

sector

of

the

ith

is the price elasticity of demand for the
where i

= l,

2.

Observing

that
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I

P1Y1 + P2Y 2 , differentiation of I leads to:

yly~ + y lp~ + y 2y~ + y 2P~

I*
or

(31)

Using equations (25) and (30)

Rearranging

or
(32)
A

B

The first term of equation (32) , A, repeats (25):

a percentage change

in w from a percentage change in E when output prices are consta nt .
The second term, B, shows the impact of changing output prices (perce ntage change in w from a percentage change in E with varying output
prices), if P~

P~

=

)._

\

0 (32) becomes (25).

Thus, the new price effect

is
S

_ -(Ll
W -

2

- !.

yG
1

J..

L2 Kl)y p* + y p*
2 2
11

If P~ ~ P~ ~ 0, depending on the price elasticity of demand for Y1 a nd
Y2 , the price effect , Sw, will either raise or diminish the change in
real wage.

Yohe concludes that elastic (inelastic) demand for Y2 and

inelastic (elastic) demand for Y1 leads to a(n) reduction (increase)
of the inc idence effect on real wages.
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Yohe, then, proceeds to show the parallel effects for r * and q*
r*

( IALKi YL2) yEE* + sr
y lG

(33)

where

IALKIYL2) p*
p*
("""'---'""'-'--"'=Y11 + Y2 2
y lG
q * .::.

r< YuYL2 - YL2YKl) IALK I]yEE*

(34)

y l y ElG

where

Welfare Impacts on Pollution Control
Using Yohe's results on the effects of pollution coqtrol on
factor rewards when both pollution levels and prices are changing, we

attempt to develop the welfare i mp lications of the model.
The foc u s will first be on the smal l country case , assuming
initially identical individuals, the n separating the individuals
within the economy into two different grou ps:
owners.

workers and capital

The second part of the analysis will treat the large country

case, following the same procedure as for the small country, with the
distinction that in the later case output prices can vary.
The small country case
In this case, it is assumed that the country is too small to
i nfluence the world product prices.

The small country cannot affect

the terms of trade ; once the countr y is trading, pre-existing world
prices are not disturbed, the small country is a price taker.
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Economy with identical individuals
To analyze the welfare impact s of pollution control, it is
necessary to look at the utility function of the co nsum ers .

Two

ass umptions are made:
l.

The economy is composed of identical individuals; in other
words, each individual has the same utility function

2.

Pollution enters directly the consumer' s utility function.
Each consumer's beha v ior is characterized by the following

utility function, which, given identical individuals, is the welfare
functio n of society.
(35)

where Yl and Y2 are, respectively, the quantity consumed of goods Y1
and Y2 , and E is the pollution from sector one.
For a given level of E, the consumers, in this case society,
maximize their utility function subject to price and national income
constraints.

The Lagrangian for this maximization problems is:
(36)

p

where p =_!_ is the constant terms of trade (small coun try assump-

p2

tion);

A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the income con-

straint; I = wL + rK + qE (as defined above); and I(p, E) is pY 1 + ¥2 •
The Lagrange function yields the following results:

Yl

Yl(p, E, I)

Y2

Y2(p, E, I )

\

A( p, E , I)

It can be seen that the solution to the co nstrained optimization
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problem represents the demand functions of society.

The optimal

consumption depends on price, the use of environment, and income.
Substituting the Lagrangian solutions into the utility
functions yields the maximum utility level which is represented by the
indirect utility function:
V = V{y1 [p, E, I(p, E)], y 2 [p, E, I(p, E)], E)

(37)

or
V = V[p, E, I(p, E)] •
The next step is to maximize utility with respect to E:
dV
dE = VE +

vraE
oi

= 0 18

(38)

The envelope theorem 19 is applied to examine the effect of a change in
environmental regulation on the maximized utrlity level.

The optimal

level of E satisfies the following simpU fication:

A.£.!.=
aE

(39)

-UE

where Ais the marginal utility of income and ~ is positive following

aE

equation ( 30).
Interpretation of eguation (39).
welfare-maximizing rule .

This result leads to the

Environment should be used to the point

where marginal profit equals marginal cost.

In this case, the optimum

level of environment use occurs at the point where the marginal
utility of income generated from its use is equal to the marginal
disutil ity from its use.

Thus, given identical individuals, the small

country, unable to affect its terms of trade, has an optimal level of
poll ui:ion control.
The above implies the use of more environment, leaving societ y
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worse off, although society might be unaware of the existence,
benefit, or harm of additional external diseconomies.
Economy with two g28ups of consumers:
and capital owners

workers

Effects of change in input regulation on welfare of workers.
Workers have the following utility function:
(40)

where yy and y~ are, respectively, the workers consumption of goods Y1
andY 2 subject to their budget constraint:

wL = PYf + yr. To maxi-

mize the workers' utility function, the following Lagrangian can be
formed:
(41)

The solution of the Lagrange function are the workers' demand
functions:
Y1

Y1(p, w, E)

Y2

Y2(p, w, E)

\ = \ (p,

w, E) •

To get the indirect utility function, the above solutions are substituted into the utility function:
L

V

L

V [ y, [p, w(E),
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E], y2 [ p, w(E), E]

(42)

simplifying
yL = vL[p, w(E), E]
Changing the level of E yields to the following:
L

aw + :£::!..__
aE

aE

Using the envelope property:

(43)
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(44)

where UE is the marginal utility of additiona l pollution control, and
A =

~
aw

is the Lagrange multiplier equal to the marginal contribution

to the maximum utility l evel made by an increase in income or the
marginal utility of income.
Interpretation of e quation (44).

The wage effect is negative.

When sector one is environment - (pollution-),

intensive and capital-

intensive in the weak factor intensity se n se and when sector two is
made labor -in tensive,

it has been seen in equation (25) that

~; < 0 .

UE, representing the disutility to workers from a n increase in the use
of environment, is also negative, so that

~iL

cannot be positive .

Hence, worker s are losing when environme ntal regulation is
relaxed.

' deA relaxation in pollution control increases E to E,

creases w, and causes the bud get constraint to shift to the left.

The

consequences of this inward shift are a restriction in workers ' con-

sumption of Y1 and Y2, while they are consuming more pollution.

Since

the sma l l country 's terms of trade are unaffected, the slope of the
budget constraint remains constant.

As a result of the above , workers

move to a lower indifference curve and are, thus, worse off than
before the regulation change .

This is shown gra phi cally in Fig ure 1,

wher e labor 's budget constraint is wL =

PYT

+ y~

It has been seen that a relaxation i n pollution control
decreases wages in both sectors .
shift of the budget 1 ine:

This is illustrated by the inward

AB is the prechange budget constraint , and

CD is the aftercha nge budget constraint.

The intercept of the budget
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(wl)A

---(slope =-p =~ = OA = OC)
P 2 08 OD

c
Y2

0 '-----"':--------'-Y1--'D"------B-(-'w"'":L-)-- y1

p
Fig . 1. The welfare effect of a change in the l evel of poll uti on control for labor.
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line on the Y1 a;is is wL (yz = 0); the intercept of the budget line
p
on the Yz axis is wL (y 1 = 0).

u is the workers original utility

I

curve ; u is their afterchange utility curve, following a decrease in
real income.

e is the workers original consumption point, at which y 1
I

and Yz are us ed up; and e
I

is the workers afterchange consumption

I

point, at which y 1 and y 2 are being consumed.
Figure 1 illustrates that, when a country's terms of trade are
constant and when there is a relaxation in environmental regulation,
the workers level of satisfaction (which depends upon their consumption and is shown by their utility curve) diminishes; they consume
less of the goods and more pollution.
Effects of change in input
talists.

Thus, the workers lose.

regulation on the

welfare of capi-

The utility function of the capital owners is:

(45)

where y~, y~ are, respectively, the capitalists consumption -of goods
Y1 and Yz subject to their income constraint:
rK

=

py~ + y~

To maximize the capitalists utility function, a Lagrangian is formed:

(46)
The solutions of the Lagrangian are the capitalists demand functions:
Yl

Yl(p, r, E)

Yz

yz(p , r, E)

A = A( p, w, E) •

Their indirect utility function is
vK = vK{ydp, r(E), 22 E], Yz[p, r(E), EJ)
or

(47)
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vk = vk[p, r(E), E] .
Differentiating with respect to E:
K

~+~
aE aE

(48)

Using the envelope property:

dl
= AK~ + U
dE
oE
E

(49)

In te rp re ta ti on of eg ua ti on ( 49) .
tive:

The revenue effect is posi-

when sector one is environment - intensive and weakly capital -

intensive and when sector two is labor-intensive, equation (26) suggests

that~~

increase.
tive .

> 0.

As pollution is increased, payments to capital

UE is negative so that ~~

Hence,

can be either positive or nega-

capitalists are either losing or gaining when environ-

mental regulation is modified.
increases E tq

K

'
E,

shift to the right .

A relaxation in pollution control

increases r, and causes the income constraint to

The co n sequences of this outward shift, for the

capital owners, is an increase in the consumption of Y1 and Y2 , while
at the same time they also are consuming more pollution.

The capi-

talists move to a higher indifference curve which is shown graphically
in Figure 2, where the capitalists' income constraint is rk = py~
K

+ y2.

The outward shift of the budget line illustrates the increase

in capital reward .

AB is the prechange income constraint, and CD is

the afterchange income constraint.

The intercept of the budget 1 ine

on the Y1 axis is rk (y 2 = 0) ; and the intercept of the budget line on
p
theY 2 axis is rk (y 1 = 0).
cur v e;

and

u'

u is the capitalists' original utility

is their aft e rchange utilit y curve,

fol l owing an

30

____ (slope = -p)

0

8(~)

D

-P

Fig. 2. The welfare effect of a change in the level of pollution control for capital .
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increase i n real income.

e is the capitalists' original consumption

point, at which y 1 and y 2 are used up; and e ' is the capitalists'
after change cons umption point, at which y 1 and y 2 are consumed.
Figure 2 illustrates that, when a country's terms of trade are
constant and when there is a relaxation in environmental regulation,
the capitalists '

welfare

eit her

improv es

if

the income effect

outweighs the pollution effect or worsens if the pollution effect is
greater than the income effect .

The large country case
In the second case, the country can affect it s terms of trade.
A large country can influence world price s.

It is then necessary to

s ummarize the large country terms of trade effects prior to concentrating on the welfare aspect of the problem.

Implications of the large coun try assumption
This section derives the likely terms of trade effects of a
relaxation in environmental regulation.

We first assume that sector

two is the importing sector, Y2 being the i mported good, to later look
at the situation where sector one is the importing sector.

Having

dealt with the two sectors separately, we will finally treat the world
as a whole.
Sector two is the import-competing sector.

Secto r

two is

assumed to be the home country while sector one is the foreign
country.

Goods move from sector one to sector t·wo.

So far, it has

been assumed that a sector's level of satisfaction or real income
depends on the bundle of commodi tie s co nsumed .

Thus, the level of
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satisfaction depends on the quantity consumed of Y2 ,

sho~n

by the

utility function .
The demand for imports or the excess demand for Y2 is:
(SO)

where M2 is the home excess demand for Y2 •
Changing the level of E:

or

3

Y2

where m = ay- denotes the home marginal propensity to import
I= pYl

+

ai
Y2, 3E =

ayl

23

; and if

ay2

IJaE+:JE

Rearrangi ng,
aM

ay

ay

3E

3E

" '·

_ 2 = p • m(-1) - (1 - m)~E2
In te rp re ta ti on of eg ua ti on (51) .

(51)
Referring to the Rybczynski

results established in equat ion (28):
ay
1

aE > 0

3M

and

2 is posit ive,
--3E

which indicates that, given constant terms of trade, home imports
increase as E increases.

The above results are shown in Figure 3.

OH

and OF are, respectively, the home and foreign offer curves . 24

lve

recall that good Y1 is sector one's import and sector two's export
good and that the opposite holds for good Y2.
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Home Imports of Y t
(For~n

Exports ol Y1)

p'
H

0

A

8

y1
HomeExportsofY 1
(FOf-'gn Imports of Y 1}

Fig. 3. Effects of an increase in the use of the input,
environment (E), on the terms of trade, when sector two is the importcompeting sector.
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The initial free trade equilib r ium i s shown by point e, with
the equilibrium terms of trade equa l

to p, the s lope of Op.25

At the

world relative price of Y1 , the home sector c hooses t o demand quantity

Yz

eA of

above its local productio n.

In order to obtain this through

imports, it has to export OA unit s of Y 1 , which has the equivalent
value .
An in c rease in E ca u ses the home offer curve to shift from OH
I

to OH , which e ngenders a lowering of the terms of trade from Op to
Op '.

I

I

The n ew equilibrium point is e, where e B of

excha nge of OB exports of Y1 •

Yz

is imported in

The relative price of Yz increases to

I

the level shown by Op, so t hat, und er the ass umed conditions, sector
two can expect a deterioration in its terms of trade.

This implies an

increase of the social cost of pollution control from what it would be
if t he terms of trade remained unchanged .
Secto r one is the import-com pe ting sector .
the home import good, and

Yz

In this case ,

is t h e hom e export goo d.

coun tr y ' s demand for imports or the excess demand for

Y1 is

The home

Y1 is :
(52)

where M1 is th e home demand for Y1.

E:

or

aM

af

=

ay
m( ~

+

ay
~)

-

ay
~

Differe ntiating with r espec t

to
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- ay 1

where m -

31""

Reordering:

oM
aE1 =

ay

ay

2 _ ( 1 _ m)- 1
p ' m(ap:-)
3E

Interpretation of e guation (53) .

ay

2
ing results, - -

3E

<

ay

1
0 and - -

3E

> 0;

(53)
Again,

so that

decrease in the home sector's imports .

recalling the preced -

~ < 0,
3E

which r eveals a

Let us see what happens to the

home exports:

X2( p,E)

=

Y2 (p,E) - y 2 [p,I(p,E) ]

(54)

where x 2 is the home exports of Y2 •
Changing the level of E:

or

Reordering,
ax
a/ =

ay

-pm(~) +

ay
(1 - m)<a/)

Interpretation of e guation (55).

(55)
ax 2 .
1s positive,

~

Thus, given

constant terms of trade, an increase in E will reduce the home exports
(Y 2 in this case).

The above results are shown in Figure 4.

The initial free trade equilibrium takes place at point e,
where p , the terms of trade, equals the price of Y2 in terms of Y1 .
Sector one demands eA of Y1 and exports OA of Y2 .

An increase in E

causes the home offer curve to shift from OH to OH'.

This shift to
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Hom.lmporta ofY 1
(Foteign Upon. of Y 1)

p

Home f•JJOtt• of v,
(Foreign lmpor1• of Y1}

Fig. 4, Terms of trade eff ects of an inc r ease in the use of
the input, enviro nment (E), when sector one is the import-compet ing
sector.
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the left initiates an increase in the terms of trade from Op to op'.
At the new equilibrium point e', OB of Y2 is exported in exchange of
e 'B of Y1 .

Hence, under the assumed conditions, sector one can expect

an improvement in its terms of trade.
The large country's terms of trade effects on the world.

If

the home budget is :

py~ + y~

p~ + y~

where H is home , and the foreign budget is:
(56)

Then the world budget is:
P(M 1 + Ml) - (Mz + M~) = 0 ,
where Ml is the foreign country's excess demand for Y1 , and M~ is the
foreign country's excess demand for Y2 .
Sector two is cleared by Walras law 26 , hence, the equilibrium
condition is:
(57)

and the home budget constraint PM 1 + Mz

0.

Rep lacing M1 by - Ml, we

obtain the balanced trade condition:
(58)
Assuming the home sector imports Yz and the foreign country does not
pollute, eq uation (58) becomes :
(59)

Following total differentiation,
oM F

oM

oM

~p
+ Mldp = ~p
+ ~
E2 E
op
op
or.-
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Rearranging
aM F

aM

[ (~ + MF1 ) - -,).p]dp
~

= aM

an

2 . dE
dE

or
(60)

where EH and EF are, respectively, the elasticity of home and foreign
demand for imports.
From equation (58), PMf = M2 .

Hence,
(61)

where

E.E.=....,.---,,-----,,--dE
Ml (E H + E F - 1)
Assuming the Marshall-Lerner ·condition for stabil ity 27 holds,
if the foreign sector imports Y1 , Mf
import s Yz,
> 0 , 2 8 then,* < 0 .

> 0,

and if the home sector

a~z

Generally,

the preceding analysis can be interpreted as yield-

ing the following results.

If there is an increase in E, providing

the Mar s hall-Lerner stability condition is satisfied , there will be an
improv e ment in the terms of trade wh e n the polluting sector is the
importing sector.

When the polluting sector is the exporting sector,

the terms of trade will deteriorate.

With these results in mind,

we

are now ready to analyze the welfare impacts of an increase in E.

Welfare impacts of poll ution control in the
large country
Eco nomy with identical individuals.

Society's indirect utility

39

function29 is:

V

= V[p, E, I(p, E)]

In the large country case, the maximization of utility with respect to
E, yields to:
dV = ~.'!E.)

dE

ap dE

+ av + 2::!._ • .lli.'!E.) + 2::!._
aE

aE

8p'dE

8E

ar - o
8£-

Again, using the envelope theorem gives:

Reordering,

Interpretation of eguation (62).
to the welfare maximizing rule:

Again, the above result leads

the environment should be used to the

point where marginal income for a country (region) equals marginal
If the home sector exports Y 1 and imports Yz, .!2. < o 30 and
dE
Y1 - y 1 > 0. The marginal cost for the large country will co nsi st of

cost.

the marginal disutility from the use of the environment and the cost
due to the deterioration in its terms of trade.

Again,

giv en

ide ntical individuals, the large country has an optimal level of
pollution control.
If the home sector exports Yz, ~

<0

and Y1 - Yl

< 0.

Economy with two groups of consumers:
1.

The effects of change in the input regulation on the welfare of
workers.

Labor's indirect utility function is: 3 1

yL = vL[p(E), w(E), E]
where p(E) indica te s that, in this case, we have variable
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commodity pri ces.

Changi ng the level E, yields:
L

iE. + ~
dE
aw

L

~+~

aE aE

Using the envelope theorem gives ,

or
(63)
I n t er pre t at1on
·
· o( n
63).
o f egua t 1
nate.

The sign of dVL
dE is indetermi -

Again, i f the home sector ex po rts Y1 ,

either be negative or pos itive.

iE. < 0
dE

and uL

E

< 0'

dw ca n
dE

In the large country case, the pro-

duct prices can vary, hence, the second t erm of equation (32), showing
the impact of changing output price s or the pric e effect on w, will
e ith er raise or diminish the cha nge in real wag es.

If ther e i s a n

i ncrease i n the level of pollution in a large sector , the worke r s will
ei ther gain or lose.
2.

Effects of change in inpu t r eg ul a tion on the welfare of
capitalists .

Ca pitalists ' indirec t utility function is :

yk = vk[p(E) , r(E), E] •
Cha nging the level of E yie ld s

Us ing the envelope theorem gives
d/

_

iE_

~ - - AyldE +

' Kdr +
dE

A

uKE
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Rearranging,

Interpretation of e q uation (64) .

If th e home sector exports

Y1 , .!P. < 0, and U~ < 0, .!!:. can either be ne ga ti v e or positive. The
dE
dE
welfare impact of a change in the pollution level on capital cannot be
clearly defined, the capitalists will either gain or lose.
In equations (63) and (64),
dw
w

dr
r

and

<i"E

<i"E

E

E

are, respectively, unsigned.

Let us reiterate the example of equation

(63):

then by assumption dw is unsigned .

Equation (32) shows why param-

dE

eters, such as the value shares, elasticities of substitution etc.
have to be known :
w* = dw _
w where

*

(32)

is the percentage change a nd where G is the matrix determinant

of equation (24) and G

< 0.

Y ' s are value shares, and

Xs are the

shares of each region's input in the production of good Y1 or Y2.

The

term

by the assumptions acquired from the Yohe, Batra-Casas model.
The first term of equation (32) is a repetition of equation
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(25) showing the effect given constant prices : as regulation is
relaxed on pollution , the pa ymen t to labor will fal l.
The second term of the equation is the
prices.

effect of changes in

This latter effect either dampens or accelerates the first

effect as prices change.
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Footnotes
17.

Gary W. Yo he, "The Backward Incidence of Pollution Control.
Some Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 6( 1979) : 194.

18.

dp = 0, p = constant.

19.

The envelope theorem shows the relationship between the
indirect utility function and the Lagrangian.
Here the
envelope property is concerned with a change in the maximum
utility level of consumers caused by a change in pollution
control. A change in a parameter generally induce s a variation
in the optim um levels of choice variables . According to the
envelope property, if the parameter change is very small, the
induced change in choice variabl es can be ignored.

20.

Capitalists do not provide labor.

21.

Wage is a function of the use of the environment. Equation
(25) shows that as regulation is relaxed on pollution, the
payments to labor will fall.

22.

Capital price is a function of the use of environment. Equa tion (26) s how s that as pollution is increased, pay~ent to K
increases.

23.

The marginal propensity to import indicates the change in
imports associated with a given change in income .

24 .

The offer curves diagram contrasts the quantity of a commodity
(Y 2) one sector (two) wishes to import against the quantity of
the other commodity (Y 1 ) offered in exchange as exports.

25.

p

26.

Walras law states that, at the equilibrium prices, excess
demand equals zero in all markets.

27.

e:H + e:F > 1
in a stable market , the sum of the two
countries ' (regions) elasticities of demand for imports exceed
unity.
The Marshall-Ler ner stability condition suggests that
in order for the market to be stable,offer curves cannot be too
inelastic, and that an increase in the relati ve price of a good
reduces world excess demand for that good.

28.

Refer to equation (28) .

=

p1
PZ

price of exports
= price of imports
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29.

Refe r to equation (37) .

30.

Refer to eq uation (61).

31 .

To see how we obtain ed the indirect u function of
refer to equations (40 ) through (42).

worker~,
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CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Some directions regarding input regulation in the context of
trade, and in the context of welfare economics, were derived from this
analysis.

Input regulation takes the form of controlling the utiliza-

tion of one factor of production,
production function.

the enviro nment,

in a three - factor

The input, enviro'n ment, was incorporated in a

Heckscher-Ohlin type of model.

In order to reduce environmental

deterioration, substitution of the enviro nm ental factor for capital
was all owed.
The model developed was based on the following
l.

assump~ions:

An economy with two sectors land 2, where l i s the polluLlng

sector, and is environment-intensive and capital-intensive in
the weak se nse
2.

Three factors of production: capital , l abor, and environment

3,

The two sectors are characterized by strictly quasiconcave
linear homoge neous production functions where any one good
cannot be produced solely by the environment

4,

Permissible pollution is regulated.

Based on these assumptions, it is

concluded that, in an open economy,

and within a general eq u ilibrium framework ,

the impacts of the

exogenously imposed changes, a relaxation (increase in the use of the
environment) in the level of pollution cont r ol on the welfare of labor
and capital are :
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A. For a small countr y ( region),
1. With identical individuals,

assuming pollution enters

dir e ctly the consumer' s utility function, the optimum use
level of the input environment , occurs at the expected point
where the marginal utility of income generated

from its use

is equal to the marginal disutility from its use.
2. With two different groups of individua l s, workers and capitalists, workers have to reduce their consumption of th e
goods and at the same time pollution is increased.

There-

fore, in this context, labor is worse off following an
increase in the use of the environment . Capitalists gain
since returns to capital increase.
B. For a large country (region),
The large co un Lry can affect its terms of trade. Providing
the Marsha l l-Lerner condition is satisfied, if there is an
increase i n the use of environment, the large cou n try can

improve its terms of trade when the polluting sector is the
importing sector .

If the polluting sector is the e xporting

sector, the terms of trade will dete riorate.
1. Given identical individuals in the economy , the environment
should be us ed to the point where marginal income for a
country (region) equals marginal cost, which consists of the
margi nal disutility from the use of the environment plus the
cost due to the deterioration in its terms of trade .
2. When two different groups are assumed,

whether workers and

capitalists will b e better or worse off than before the
regulation changes, cannot be unambiguously determined .
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The derivations under this assumption lead to a problem of
signing the welfare changes .

The parameters in the model

that would determine the sign of these changes to ind i viduals include the magnitude of the factor intensities, the
elasticities of substitution between factors, the value
sha re of the goods in national income, the signs of the
price changes, and the strong and weak definition of factor
in tensity ranking s.
In the large country case, with two groups of consumers, and
given varia ble prices, the results are indeterminate.

Empirical esti -

mates of input substitution, etc. are needed to sign the effects under
these cases.

The change in wages and return to capital in response to

changes in the use of the environment are unsigned.

The components of

these change relationships, as derived in Chapter III, include factor
shares , factor intensities, and input substitution elasticities.

Wage

c hanges a nd, si milarly, changes in returns to capital are affected by
not only factor intensities and value s hares but also by the new price
effect as prices are allowed to vary .

Variable commodity prices may

alter the sig n, which was negative for the wage change relat ionship
and positive for changes in returns to capital in the constant prices
case, depending on the value share, factor intensity, and e lasticity
of substitution parameters.

This price can serve to dampen or accel -

er ate the effect which changes wages and returns to capital under
constant prices .

It also is possible that the price effect can change

in such a way as to reverse the direction of changes in wages and
returns to capital compared to the changes under constant prices.

The
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occurrence of such a reversal depends on the magnitude of the commodity price changes and on the sha res of the commodities in nat io nal
income (sum of regional incomes).

As prices vary with output, and,

for example , price changes in the polluting sector are positive while
price changes in the other sector a r e negative and greater in magnitude, the wage changes are negative.
For example, during the 1970s, electricity (coal-fired production) prices were leading the CPI and most manufactured goods prices.
That direction for price changes would suggest, using the above conclusions, that the negative effect on labor would be accelerated, and
the positive effect on capital likewise accelerated.
Regional and Environmental Issues and the Welfare
Implications of the Model
Although the result s of differentiation of the model only
indi cates the theoretical directions of the changes in factor rewards
a s the use of the environment is altered by changes in environmental
regulation, these directions do r ela te to international and regional
development and environmental regulation issues.
It is increasingly being realized that economic activities in
one region produce external effects on neighbors.

This is one of the

ph ysical aspects of the interregional pollution problem.

Another one

is that through the purchase of products which use the environmental
input f rom a remote region, s uch as clean air, a state ca n benefit
from free air .

Part of the electric power of Los Angeles for example

is imported from Utah.

With the addition of the Intermountain Power

Proj ect still more power is to be produced (using Utah and Wyoming
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coal) and transmitted to Los Angeles.

By buying electricity generated

at such a distance , Los Angeles imports clean air and exports part of
its pollution to Utah .

It is precisely this interregional externality

which caused the concern over the siti ng of such a large power producing project as Intermountain Power.

The plant is currently being

constructed in Utah's western desert where the use of air apparently
is not as critical to environmental esthetics associated with national
parks on the Colorado Plateau where most of Utah's coal is locat ed .
Indeed, there is some evidence to s ugge s t that the costs of the power
production from the project will be signi ficantly greater than current
and projected costs of coal-fired power production at the Huntington,
Emery, and other poer production near coal mines in Carbon County in
eastern Utah (see, for example , Snyder et al. 1983, and Snyder and
Keith 1981). 32
Utah depends significan tl y on the development of energy
resources such as coal and environmental resources such as clean air

and national parks to maintain a viable state eco nomy.

It has been

shown in this study that changes in environmental regulations can
influence factor rewards in a regional economy.

Coal is used in

combination with capital, labor'· and the environment to produce el ectricity and steel in Utah .

Coal-fired electric power production a nd

steel production are rel ati vel y environment-intensive industries which
exist in Utah; and the results of this study , although theoretical in
nature, do give us some insight on the effects of environmenta l policy
changes on returns to factors in the region.

so
Although full evidence is not given here, Utah cannot be c lassifie d in the large region case as far as coa l and power production
a r e conce rned.

Utah coal is low in s ulfur (the main pollutant) and

high in heat content, but Uta h' s coal cannot be surface-mined and
competes with several substitute coals mined in the West.

For exam-

ple, Utah faces competition from Wyoming surface-mined coal, which is
also relati v ely low in sulfur content (but has a slightly lower heat
co ntent).

Although, as pointed out by Hachman,3 3 the greater the cost

of transportation, the less the importance of the difference in mining
cost between Utah underground and Wyoming surface coal.

If,

indeed,

Utah could be considered a price-taking r egion (small regi on) in this
sense , then relaxation of e nvironmental standards pertaining to emissions from mining on electric power production which emits sulfur
dioxide would result i n a reduction in the welfare of labor while
owners of capital could gain or lose.

Of course, this infer e nce i s

only justified if all the conditions implied by the assumptions of the
model used hold.
Environmental regulations c l ear l y favor some regions a t the
expense of others. There i s also a commercial side to the r egional
problem. Interregional trade stems from qualitative and price differences between region.

As revealed by Ackerman and Hass ler, 34 in the

case of coal, the volume, pattern, and direction of trade are bound to
be influenced by measures adopted by Congress to combat sou rc es of
pollutio n and , indeed, have been.
The g r owi ng concern about the degradation of the environment
caused b y industrial activities has led the government to adopt
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stricter measures to protect and e nha nce the quality of the environment.

The U. S. National Environment Act (NEPA) of 1970 indicated the

emergence of a series of legislative actions to protect the environment.

In 1978, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pro-

posed a $40 billion regulat i on to reduce sulfur emissio ns from coalfired plants.

This indicated a preference in sulfur removal (or

tightening of controls) over the use of low sulfur coal (substitution
of the energy input for the use of the environment).

In the West,

coal. is relatively low i n sulfur, the most notorious pollutant associated with coal burni ng.
environmental concerns,

These energy restrictions, motivated by

increase domestic costs.

In order to el imi-

nat e the residual from the exhaust gases, new coal-fired electricity
generating plants are required to use the best control technologies
(including scrubbers), which increase the cost of generating electricity.

The strip mining regulations for Western coal along with the

protection of the market shares of high cost Eastern coal, especially
through the requirement for 90 percent sulfur removal from c oal even
if low-sulfur western coal is burned, also contribute to the removal
of some of the competitive advantage of lower cost, lower sulfur
content coal.
The electric power industry also faces opposition to locating
its facilities in certain areas.

While the 1971 Clean Air Act's new

source performance standard (NSPS) encouraged the use of low sulfur
coal, the 1978 provisions were partl y conceived to make high sulfur
coal as economically attractive to utilities as low sulfur coal in
order to co unter the relocation of U.S. coa l production to the West .
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In spite of the 1978 revisions, Western coal production is
still rising.

The West has a lower mining cost (surface mining in

Wyoming and Montana) which enables the producers to ship coal long
distances.

Also, the expansion of the wester n coa 1-fired electrical

capacity cou ld raise local demand over the long run.

Under current

standards, the major determinants of coal selection remain mining
costs and transportation rates, low sulfur content is only a small
influence.
The difference in the quality of the polluting resource or in
the amount of the pollutants in the resource among regions may influe nce the location of future plants, marginal changes in plant expansion or contraction and the production techniques.

Most of these

changes would have both a direct and indirect effect on employment,
i.e., a technological change lnduceU by compliance with environmental

regulation may alter the capital-labor mix in the production process.
The degree to which the preference classes, workers, and capitalists, ultimately benefit from a relaxation (increase in the use of
the environme n t) in control is not obvious ; nor is it evident how
changes in consumption and production patterns induced by regulation
changes affect various regions, industries, or occupations.

The popu-

lar myth is tha t tighter pollution control triggers unemployment.
The substitution of capital and labor for environmental use or
pollution in the production process must be analyzed .

Looking at the

welfare implications, it appears that unambiguous conc lusions cannot
be derived without knowing the empirical context.
In this analysis it was assumed that only sector one uses the
environment via pollution and in that sector,

only capital is
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substitutable with the environment,

Yohe s uggests that higher elas-

ticities indicate easier substitut ion a nd, therefore, facilitates the
cleaning of t h e production efflue n t.

He also suggests that, since

capital is used almost exclusively in the production process , the
elasticity between labor and pollution is neg ligible.
Empirical research has shown that polluting industries operate
with a higher capital/labor ratio than other manufacturing industries.
Over the last decade, due to increase d emand for electricity, construction lags, inflation a nd, air pollut ion control costs, the utili ties costs for power plant construction have rise n sharply, exacerbating the capital-intens i ve nature of the indu stry .
Also, historically, e nergy (coal in this case), and capital
have been s hown to be complements; consequently, pr ice increases slow
down capital forma tion.

Energy and labor are substitutes, s uggesting

that the use of labor should be rising, which in turn, would ca use the
average productivity of labor to fa ll. It is most likely that the
elasticity of s ubstitut ion of capital a nd labor for e nvironment is
less than one.

Th i s ha s been fou nd to be the case in elect ri c power

production . 35
In recent years, pollution has come
discussion,

to the fore of

public

the concerns about the trade- off between economic growth

and enviro nm ental qualit y have become ce ntral to economic policy .
Env ironme nt disruption can cause repercussion beyond the boundaries of
a region, not necessarily taking the form of physically transmitting
pollutants, but influen cing the pattern, volume, and terms of trade .
The re~ults of this study address some of these issues.
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Limits of the Research
The conclusions

drawn are

not unambiguous predictions,

particularly in the large country (region) case.

Rather, they took

the form of stating a range of likely outcomes of the process . This
theory thus precludes a great deal.
range of likely outcomes,

However, we hope that within the

it will provide some valuable information

about the welfare impacts of pollution control.
Empirical research is beyond the scope of this study.
analysis

Our

was confined to the theoretical aspects of the issue.

Nevertheless, we used some empirical examples to highlight the directio ns that changes in factor rewards may take given the conclusions of
the derived theory.

A myriad of assumptions are made in this study.

It was not our purpose to elaborate a general comprehensive theory of
the welfare impact of pollution.
what these effects might be.

Rather, an attempt was made to show

In order to do so, a simple model is

used and a focus on its special properties and implications for altering controls was completed.
We find in Solow's view on assumptions a reflection of our
belief that in order to understand a complex real world, one needs to
construct a simple imaginary world, each of which includes one, or a
few, important aspects of the real world, and to study their workings.
"Simplifying assumptions are not an excrescence on model-building;
they are its essence.';l

6

Once the simple models are understood,

they

can be made more complicated by combining them or by introducing more
realistic elements, and eventually all the important aspects of the
real world might be understood.
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Suggestions for Future Research
The actual empirical work is needed to confirm the directions
given by the theory.

However, one encounters a data problem, the

facts available are from controlled observations.
More work needs to be done to investigate the interregional
context.

Environmental restrictions may vary among regions,

but the

producers affected by those divergences are linked by a common commodity price through trade.
Another extension of the model, out of the scope of this s tudy,
is to deal with prices and tax regulation and imposition on energy
sources in the presence of externalities.

This should be a fruitful

research effort since there are alternative tax structures which are
imposed on energy resources (depending on the state involved), some of
the purposes of which are to presumably alter externalities which are
generated by the extraction and use of these resources.
General predictions have been laid down about the

direction

and the extent of changes as the degree of regulation is altered.
empirical work should give deeper insights
those changes.

The

to the signs of some of

We must conclude that our ability to test the model

empirically is most limited.

To this incapacity, must be added the

fact that other problems have been neglected.

However, we do hope

that our attempt to derive the we lfare implications of pollution
control reveals some valuable directions which can be developed
empirically in future endeavors, and which can give direction to
public pol icy.
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Don L. Snyder, John E. Keith, Terrence F. Glover, and Gene L.
Wooldridge, ''Planning for Industria 1 Location: A Comprehensive
Screening Process," Southwestern Review of Management and Economics 3(1, Winter 1983):33-45; and Don L. Snyder, and John E.
Keith, "Economic Feasibility of Siting Energy Facilities in
Utah," Chapter 4 in Utah Energy Facility Siting Study, Phase
II: Colorado Plateau for Utah Consortium for Energy Research
and Education,~

33.

Frank Hachman, The Utah Energy Facility Siting Study, Phase I:
Great Basin, Chapter 4, Utah Consortium for Energy Research and
Education, University of Utah/Utah State University/Brigham
Young University, 1981.

34.
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New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1981.
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35.

Mohammad Fatoorechie, "Input Substitution in the Coal-Fired
Electric Power Industry." (Ph.D. dissertation, Utah State
Univesity 1979), p. 63.

36.
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(1973):267.
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Appendix 1:

Proof of Equation 22

Equation (22) can be rewritten as

where
\L jys(yK2- YK1)
YK

R~

Rt

= IAKEIALjYKj + IALEIAKjYLj = AL jAKj

5(~~2

- YE1)

= jAKLjAEjYKj + jAELI AKjyEj = AKjAEjYs(YL2 - YL1)
YL

where y 5 =~for s = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; s ~ j; and yi = share of factor
i in nation income, i.e. Yi =
eq uation (23):

lf.

Hence, eq uation (22,) is reduced to

R = Aw*+ Br* + cq*, where

A= (yK2- YKl);\L j\E jysotE
YK

(yE2 · _ YE1)1\L j\K jys 0 lK
YE

B = (yE2 - YEl);\L j\K jysotK
YE

C = (yL2 -

YLl);\K 1 \E jys0 ~E
YL

(yK2 -

YKl) ~\L j \E jys 0 tE
YK
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Appendix 2 :

Proof of Equation (28)

From equations (25) through (27) we get:

*

(a)

w

•

- r '

-( y K2YE l + YL2YEl) I ALK I E*
= --==---=-=-----=-='-----=.:.__-

G
(b)

r

*

- q

*

=

( y L2YEl - YLly K2 + YL2YKl)I\LKIE*

-==--=..:o--=:.::....c=----==---=-=----'---===-G

The subs titution of equation (a) and (b) into (14) and (15) and then
into the 01 , DK terms to derive
D1 =

(c)

- (yK2YEl

+ YL2 YE l l[\KIE*C\lYKl 0 LK + \2YK2°;L

<0

G

( \ K2 \E l +

\L2\El) I\LK IE*( \KlyL1°~K

+

\K2YL2°~K

G

+

\KlyEl 0 ~E[yL2YEl

+ (yL2YKl- YLlyK2)li\KI E*

>O

G

with L* = K* = 0 , (19) and (20) are r educe d to:
(e)

_\ KlDL .- \1°K
\ Ll \K2 - \ Kl \ L2

The substit ution of (c) and (d) into (e) and (f) yields equation (28)
y*
1

>0

o*
whic h are the Ry bc yns ki results.

